Authoritarianism’s
Popular Base
Inexorably
linked to self-identity molded by the social environment, political identity, shaped
by social class and the hegemonic culture, largely determines the individual’s participation
in the political arena. Not the only factor that shapes political behavior,
social mobility along with cultural conditioning is the catalyst to molding
political identity. In the age of mass politics where bourgeois political
parties inculcate the idea that sovereignty rests with the voting masses rather
than with the elites determining the political class, sociopolitical
mobilization becomes especially important amid the prospect of downward social
mobility affecting the middle class and workers.
The
twilight of the merit-based upward mobility, especially among younger people, has
shaken public confidence in the Western liberal value system. Erosion of such
confidence has been taking place just as neoliberal politicians in the past
four decades were promising a better life for millennials and generation Z taking
the hardest hit from downward mobility. The direct historical correlation
between downward social mobility and the rise of authoritarianism points to the
chasm between what the political economy promises and what it actually delivers.
This holds true for all countries, including the advanced capitalist core
operating under the umbrella of a pluralist representative government where the
promise of upward mobility is the elusive goal.
Following
the deep recession of 2008, the transition from a liberal model to one that
incorporates characteristic of authoritarian regime has been most striking
especially in countries that underwent austerity whether under the auspices of
the International Monetary Fund-sponsored or nationally imposed. Resulting in income
transfer from the lower income groups to the highest, austerity created popular
resistance that in some cases has been met by policies typically identified
with authoritarian regimes.
Needless
to point out, the socioeconomic elites demanding income redistribution from the
bottom up fully supported austerity measures as part of recovering capital lost
during the recession. Consequently, the focus of bourgeois politicians was
whether to further legitimize the authoritarian model as a means of managing
the neoliberal political economy, or maintain vestiges of pluralism and a
social safety net that projects the image of a democratic society. Ultimately,
the core issue was the manner with which to manage growing inequality amid
downward social mobility, while maintaining a popular voting base.
Contrary
to popular belief, which the right wing media and apologists of authoritarianism
promote, it is not the working class as much as the middle class that supports
authoritarianism amid downward mobility. This was the case with the transition
from liberal democracy to Fascism in Italy in the early 1920s and in Germany in
the early 1930s. As the middle class realized that downward socioeconomic
mobility entails descending to the level of the working class, the reaction was
to rhetorically castigate the capitalist elites and globalization, while
seeking solutions in an authoritarian political party to rescue them from the
downward cycle through repressive measures at the expense of the working class
and dissidents advocating more equitable income distribution. Anti-globalization
in the form of nationalism became the rallying cry of authoritarian politicians
in the quest to mobilize popular support amid disillusionment with the
political class.
The
realization that a liberal pluralist society no longer yields upward mobility
entails insecurity about the future and disillusionment with the core value
system of Western liberalism on the part of the middle class and workers alike,
regardless of whether their political identity is with the right center or left.
Inability to maintain living standards amid rising cost of living, and insecurity
about the future drives the petit bourgeoisie to embrace the mythology of right
wing rhetoric promising upward mobility through authoritarian measures.
Populist right wing politicians and advocates of authoritarianism deflect the
public’s attention by offering culture wars as a substitute for policy that
would reverse downward social mobility.
Following
the lead of right wing politicians and media, the middle class blames “liberal
elites” for pursuing globalization, and the exploited working class for
demanding social justice through varieties of ways including unionization,
equal pay for equal work, etc. Besides failing to assess accurately the
contradiction of capitalism’s creation of social injustice, the middle class aspiration
to become a capitalist, combined with the fear that it could reduced to working
class status are elements that authoritarian politicians and propagandists
exploit. They offer voters “someone to hate”, namely, marginalized social
groups and a select few billionaire advocates of globalization, with China as
the new Cold War enemy on which to default calamities befalling the working
class.
Besides
a segment of the middle class supporting authoritarianism as a political
solution amid downward social mobility, a minority of the working class has a
similar reaction with a different focus. Invariably “labor aristocracy”, that
is, the higher paid working class, espouses the same position as the petite
bourgeoisie on authoritarianism, thus projecting the image that workers make up
the popular base of the right wing. Lower-paid workers generally support centrist
or progressive policies, while the lumpenproletariat remains apathetic, thus
susceptible to right wing propaganda. More characteristic of the higher paid
working class than the middle class, anti-immigration and anti-minority
attitudes, which authoritarian politicians and right wing media propagate to
deflect focus from the political economy responsible for downward social
mobility, become the catalyst for mobilizing mass support.
The higher
the level of downward mobility, chronic rather than ephemeral owing to cyclical
economic contractions, the more intense the xenophobic, racist, and misogynist
attitudes on the part of higher-paid white workers who feel threatened by the
marginalized low-wage migrant and minority workers. In addition, low-wage
laborers in Asia and Latin America are the other enemy, rather than the multinationals
exploiting such labor. Not just right wing media and politicians, but
mainstream liberal politicians and media analysts contribute to this phenomenon
by focusing on culture wars rather than global capitalism undercutting the
working class in all countries, regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, etc.
The
tendencies of the petit bourgeois and upper working class elements is to oppose
the liberal pluralist institutional structure which they see as an obstacle to
upward mobility. In addition, they argue against the multilateral world order
and in favor of a strong nationalist identity. Ironically, the goal of
progressive and reactionary workers and the middle class converges in so far as
both sides advocate upward mobility. However, they differ sharply on the means
of achieving it and who is at fault for the underlying problem. Progressives
see social justice as the overarching solution for society, while reactionaries
support hierarchical authoritarianism that would serve narrow class interests.
Downward
Mobility and the Rise of Authoritarianism in the US
After
the recession of 2008, sharp downward social mobility coincided with the rise
of right wing populism in a number of countries, among them India, Brazil, Hungary,
Austria, Poland, and US. The recession took place against the background of
chronic widening income gap globally. China was a notable exception owing
largely to the government stimulating internal demand to compensate for the drop
in exports – balancing the export-oriented growth strategy with income
distribution designed to lift millions out of poverty. India also made inroads
on the global social mobility rankings, but not nearly at the level of China
that ranks 45 as compared to 76 out of 82 countries, below Brazil and slightly
above Pakistan.
In
developed and semi-developed countries, expectations for horizontal economic
growth translating into upward social mobility never materialized, despite corporate
bailout economic recovery. On the contrary, downward mobility was the new
reality with which to contend amid vertical economic growth. During the
presidential election of 2012, Obama candidly admitted that economic recovery
from the recession was in full swing but the richest 1% benefited, while the
bottom 70% suffered continued decline of income.
Whether
under the auspices of the Internal Monetary Fund (IMF) or imposed by individual
governments, since 2008 austerity measures contributed to capital
concentration, while hastening downward mobility as government focused on
corporate bailout and varieties of corporate subsidies. Reacting to anger from
the middle class and workers, traditional conservative political parties around
the world, including the US Republican Party, moved to the camp of right wing
populism at the local level gradually capturing national leadership. Going as
far as to embrace aspects of classical interwar Fascism, they further inculcated
skepticism into the political consciousness of the public regarding the
legitimacy of the liberal institutional structure intertwined with
globalization.
Rhetorically
oppose globalization, while embracing national capitalism, right wing political
parties presented themselves as advocates of the middle class and struggling workers
whose income had stayed the same in real terms for decades. Injecting
skepticism about globalization-based liberal world order, the right wing often
wrapped rhetoric in outlandish conspiracy theories about the liberal political
and social elites trying to create a world government. The result of such
propaganda was a weakened centrist bourgeois consensus and polarization not
just the political arena, but all institutions. Combined with the socioeconomic
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump’s right wing presidency encouraged right
wing populism at home and globally. The symbolism of his populist right wing
presidency contributed to wider global skepticism about the social order and
elites that transcend national boundaries whose goal is one world government.
More
than a century after US Socialist Party leader Eugene Debs declared that the
existing social order founded on inequality was immoral and unsustainable, the
Republican Party had fully embraced aspects of Fascist ideology, questioning
mainstream institutions as part of the “deep state”, liberal elites whose
interests were linked to China, and progressive dissidents trying to impose
egalitarianism and erase American identity of rugged individualism as depicted
in the mythology of exceptionalism about the inherent superiority of the white
Anglo-Saxon Protestant capitalist. The goal behind the Republican Party’s move
to the authoritarian camp was and remains to maintain a mostly white popular
base and win elections amid a sharp rise in socioeconomic inequality, with the
help of voter suppression laws among other means such as redistricting laws.
Instigating culture wars, legislating voter exclusion at the state level, and
publicly supporting white supremacy groups, the new reactionary Republican
Party invokes religion, nationalism, and militarism as cloaks of traditional
conservative values to obfuscate and distract from the underlying class
struggle.
Considering
that downward social mobility is continuing without prospects of reversing
course, the right wing populist electoral challenge is to capture a popular
base among the middle class and workers. For its part, the Democratic Party has
addressed rising socioeconomic inequality by defending the bourgeois institutional
structure, pledging to defend the pluralist society and restore some social
safety net measures. To protect the privileged capitalist class while
suppressing aspirations of the working class and the dwindling debt-ridden middle
class, both political parties are committed to corporate welfare capitalism
under different political models.
Both
parties distance their ideological and policy positions from the progressive
social justice platform; both use the military industrial complex as leverage
to maintain a domestic culture of fear of the “foreign enemy”, while maintaining
a global competitive edge rapidly eroding. The Republican Party no longer makes
any pretenses about its commitment to authoritarianism. For its part, the
Democratic Party is desperately fighting to conserve the status quo ante with a
heavy emphasis on “identity groups” including blacks, Muslims, Hispanics, LGBTQ
and others, as a substitute for social justice that would encompass all and
address the growing income inequality and downward social mobility.
As income distribution becomes more uneven amid capital
concentration, right wing populist support from the middle class and a segment
of the working class will continue to grow in the US and other countries. In
part, this is because the left is weaker and more divided than the right.
Vacillating between pluralist liberals like President Joe Biden and progressive
candidates like Senator Bernie Sanders, the latter with no chance of winning,
the progressives are invariably co-opted by the bourgeois center which needs progressive
popular support to win but largely ignores the progressive agenda.
Despite division within the rightist camp between traditional
conservatives and advocates of authoritarianism, the right is stronger than the
bourgeois-co-opted left. This is not only the case in the US but in most
countries, as elections have become a dilemma of “the lesser evil”. While there
is division within the conservative camp, it reflects the division among some
capitalists concerned about losing a segment of the diverse consumer base if
society alienates liberals and progressives who make up the majority of the population.
Liberal politicians use the issue of pluralism to emphasize that it is not
smart business to alienate both workers and consumers in a world economy where
race, ethnicity, gender, religion and lifestyle must be considered.
Although at ease about their stability within a pluralist
liberal regime and with globalization, most corporations vehemently oppose the
progressives that demand social justice, upward mobility, equality, and a
functioning democracy where government is accountable to the people instead of
Wall Street. The divided liberal-progressive popular base is a key reason for
the stronger right wing political movement, especially given the active or
tacit support of capitalist behind the right wing. This entails the constant
move of the entire political arena to the right amid continuing downward social
mobility. In the next economic downturn, the US already has a political party
with the ideological and political makings of a native-style Fascist Party. Given
the expanding local and state-base of the populist right wing, it will be very easy
for any number of Republicans to rise to power as Fascist in ideology and
policies, while claiming to represent democracy.
